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I. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ADDRESSED  
       (1). Were the substantial rights of Edwards prejudiced by the Hearing Officer’s 
actions?  
   (2). Is Edwards entitled to an award of costs and attorney’s fees? 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
 The various assertions made in the Department’s Response Brief will be 
addressed in the order they appear in such Brief. 
 First, the Department asserts that Edwards’ argues that the disqualification was 
improper because he was not operating a commercial vehicle at the time of the offenses. 
(Respondent’s Brief, p. 7). This is not Mr. Edwards’ argument at all. The significance of 
the fact that Mr. Edwards did not commit any of the offenses at issue while operating a 
commercial vehicle is twofold. A person who is operating a commercial vehicle under the 
influence versus operating a commercial vehicle while not under the influence has legal 
significance. It changes the characterization of the offender’s actions, which potentially 
affects the penalties an offender is subject to. Also, this distinction affects the manner in 
which the offender’s actions are perceived, relative to the principal rationale of Idaho’s 
statutory scheme, namely, to keep intoxicated driver’s from operating large trucks on the 
roadway, creating an increased risk to the public. In short, any emphasis placed on the 
fact that Mr. Edwards was not operating a commercial vehicle while under the influence
is critical to addressing these two points.
Second, the Department admits in its Briefing that “CDL drivers will lose their
CDL for conviction 0f a DUI and/or a motorist’s refusal to submit to evidentiary testing
or failing such testing.” (Respondent’s Brief, p. 8). This serves to buttress Mr. Edwards’
argument. Mr. Edwards maintains that his disqualifications caused the loss 0f his CDL,
not simply the privileges associated therewith. The Department’s statement, cited above,
certainly seems to support what Mr. Edwards has long asserted.
Third, the Department relies upon two case citations, neither of Which has any
application to the present case — Peck v. State, Department 0f Transportation, 156 Idaho
112, 320 P.3d 1271 (Ct. App. 2014) and Williams v. ITD, 153 Idaho 380, 283 P.3d 127
(Ct. App. 2012). In Peck, the claims asserted by Peck were that (1) his procedural due
process rights were violated because he was not given notice of the disqualification
provisions 0f I.C. § 49-335; therefore, his evidentiary testing was performed without
implied consent, Violating his constitutional right t0 be free from unreasonable search and
seizure; and (2) the disqualification 0f his CDL violated his substantive due process
rights because the disqualification bore no rational relationship t0 a legislative purpose
that was not already accomplished through the ALS suspension. In Williams on the other
hand, Williams asserted that, (1) despite being civil in nature, the lifetime disqualification
of his CDL was so punitive as t0 effectively be a criminal penalty and thus subjecting
him to multiple punishments and convictions in Violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause;
(2), that I.C. § 18-8002 is unconstitutional as applied to him under the void-for-Vagueness
doctrine because the statute failed to inform him that a failed breath test would affect his
CDL; (3) that the ITD violated his substantive due process rights as his lifetime
disqualification bore no rational relationship t0 the legislative objective of I.C. § 49—335;
and (4) that his lifetime CDL disqualification was/is so punitive that it is the equivalent to
either an excessive fine or cruel and unusual punishment, or both.
None of these claims have been asserted by Mr. Edwards in the case at bar.
Furthermore, none of these cases ever attempted to answer the question 0fWhen a person
ceases to be considered the “holder” of a CDL, as that issue was never raised in the two
cases cited above. The two cases therefore, are valueless in terms of providing assistance
t0 deciding the issues raised in the present case.
Fourth, the Department asserts that it takes positive action by the CDL holder t0
shift from a CDL driver to a non-CDL driver, such as going to the DMV and physically
giving up the CDL. (Respondent’s Brief, pp. 13-14). The Department offers n0 legal
authority to back this proposition, and it is doubtful that any exists. Moreover, the
physical surrender of one’s CDL would leave a driver Without even a Class D license.
Additionally, the idea of physically surrendering the CDL contradicts the very argument
the Department makes later in its Brief that disqualification only affects the CDL
privileges but not the license, and that nothings needs to be done t0 reinstate a
disqualified CDL except to wait out the disqualification period. If only the CDL
“privileges” are affected, not the license, and one only need to wait for the
disqualification period to expire, then why would anyone go through the trouble of
making a trip to the DMV and having to get a new physical license at the end of the
disqualification period? Moreover, it is helpful to think in terms 0f the DUI statutory
scheme. A driver in a non-CDL DUI setting is not required to surrender their physical
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license, despite say, an adverse ALS ruling sustaining the suspension; why then would a 
person with a CDL, having also received an adverse ruling, have to turn in the physical 
license even though the license is inherently invalid? And finally, the question arises, if 
the physical license is surrendered, does this impose upon the driver additional 
requirements at the end of the disqualification period, such as applying for a brand new 
CDL as if he/she never had one in the first instance? Remember, it is the position of the 
Department that one only has to wait out the disqualification period to get reinstatement. 
 Fifth, the Department attempts to explain away the case of  State v. Matalamaki, 
139 Idaho 341, 79 P.33d 162 (Ct. App. 2003), which held that, “[I]f the individual’s 
driving privileges are revoked, disqualified, or suspended, the individual’s license is 
inherently invalid.” However, the Court therein did not differentiate between a Class A 
license and a Class D license. The key point is simply whether there was a 
disqualification, and the effect thereof.  
Sixth, the Department wishes to compare disqualification with revocation, 
cancellation and suspension, ultimately coming to the conclusion that, “Unlike 
revocation, cancellation, or suspension, a disqualification only withdraws the privilege to 
operate a commercial vehicle. Disqualification does not affect the non-commercial 
driver’s license. Revocations affect the person’s license or privilege to operate a motor 
vehicle; suspensions affect the person’s license or privilege to drive. A disqualification 
only affects the privilege to operate a commercial vehicle, not the license.” (Respondent’s 
Brief, p15). The Department’s position ignores I.C. § 49-326 which  governs the 
authority of the Department to suspend, disqualify or revoke driver’s license and 
privileges, which provides in part: 
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Upon the hearing, the department shall either rescind its order or, with 
good cause, may affirm or extend the suspension or disqualification of the 
driver’s license or revoke the driver’s license. 
(emphasis added).  
 Seventh, the Department seeks to discount the application of  I.C. § 49-328, 49-
326 and 49-301(5). With respect to Idaho Code § 49-328, the section provides in 
pertinent part that when the period of disqualification of a driver's license has expired, or 
the reason for the disqualification or suspension no longer exists, the department shall 
reinstate the driver's license or driving privileges on application of the driver. This 
section demonstrates that affirmative action must be taken before a license is reinstated. 
If the prescribed affirmative steps are not taken, the license will remain disqualified, 
meaning it is inherently invalid (as to its Class A status). As to  I.C. § 49-326, the statute 
governing the authority of the Department to suspend, disqualify or revoke driver’s 
license and privileges, the statute provides the Department’s authority, upon hearing, is 
limited to, (in relevant part),  disqualification of the license. Clearly, the Department’s 
stated authority is limited to taking certain actions with respect to the driver’s license, not 
simply the “privileges” associated therewith.    
Eighth, as previously noted in earlier briefing, the Department wishes to utilize a 
“refusal conviction” as a basis for imposing Edwards’ lifetime CDL disqualification. It is 
the position of the Department that it is the failure to take the breath test that is the 
offense, not the ultimate result of the criminal charge. (Respondent’s Brief, p. 16). This 
position is erroneous. Idaho Code § 49-335(4) prescribes in relevant part that a person is 
disqualified for the period of time set forth in 49 CFR 383 if found to have committed 
two or more of the offenses committed two or more of the offenses specified in 
subsection one or two of Idaho Code § 49-335.   
49 CFR 383.51(a)(3) in turn provides in part:
(3) A holder of a CLP or CDL is subject to disqualification sanctions designated
in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, if the holder drives a CMV or non-CMV and is
convicted of the violations listed in those paragraphs. (emphasis added).
And,
(4) Determining first and subsequent Violations. For purposes of determining first
and subsequent Violations of the offenses specified in this subpart, each conviction for
any offense listed in Tables 1 through 4 to this section resulting from a separate incident,
whether committed in a CM_V 0r non-CMV, must be counted.
Both 0f these sections explicitly refer to a “conviction”.
Under 49 CFR 383.5 1(b) If a driver operates a motor vehicle and is convicted of
...for a second conviction 0r refusal to be tested in a separate incident or any combination
of offenses in this Table while operating a non-CMV, a CLP or CDL holder must be
disqualified from operating a CMV for life, for refusing to take a test for alcohol
concentration. (emphasis added).
Pursuant t0 Idaho Code § 49-104(15)(b), a “conviction” in relevant part, is
defined as an unvacated adjudication of guilt, or determination that a person has violated
0r failed to comply With the law. The Department has also cited t0 the definition under
federal law.
Here, Mr. Edwards’ “refusal conviction” was vacated and dismissed by the Court.
Thus, there was no refusal conviction (unvacated adjudication 0f guilt), and similarly, no
determination that Mr. Edwards had violated or failed to comply With the law.
Consequently, the refusal cannot be utilized as a basis for imposing Edwards’ lifetime
CDL disqualification.
III.
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF MR. EDWARDS HAVE BEEN PREJUDICED BY
THE HEARING EXAMINER’S ACTIONS.
Idaho Code § 67-5279 requires that that the agency action be affirmed unless
substantial rights 0f the appellant have been prejudiced. Here, there can be no question
that Mr. Edwards’ substantial rights have been prejudiced.
Our Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have recognized the importance of one’s
driving privileges. For example, the Supreme Court in State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho 1, 704
P.2d 333 (1985), discussing the suspension of Ankney’s driver’s license, said:
Because the suspension of issued driver’s licenses involves state action
that adjudicates important interests of the licensees, licenses may not be
taken away without procedural due process. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105,
97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91
S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971).
State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho at 3-4. Concerning the nature and weight 0f the private
interest affected, the Supreme Court added:
It is well recognized that an individual's interest in his driver's license is
substantial. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 11, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 2617,
61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112, 97 S.Ct. 1723,
1727-28, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977).
State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho at 4. Subsequently, in Matter ochNeely, 119 Idaho 182, 804
P.2d 911 (Idaho App. 1990), a case involving a McNeely’s driver’s license suspension
under Idaho Code § 18-8002 for the failure to submit t0 a BAC test at the time 0f his
arrest for DUI, the Court 0f Appeals reiterated:
Suspension of a driver's license pursuant to the implied consent statute is a
state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensee; the licensee
cannot be divested of this liberty interest Without procedural due process.
See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977);
State V. Ankney, supra.
Matter ochNeely, 119 Idaho at 190. The Court 0f Appeals then elaborated on
McNeely’s interest in his driver’s license:
It is well recognized that an individual's interest in a driver‘s license is
substantial. See Mackey v. Montrym, supra; State v. Ankney, supra.
However, the licensee's interest is not so substantial as to require a
presuspension hearing, Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. at 113, 97 S.Ct. at 1727-
28, although it may be affected by the length 0f the suspension period and
timeliness of a postsuspension review proceeding. Mackey v. Montrym,
443 U.S. at 12, 99 S.Ct. at 2618. Under I.C. § 18-8002, the licensee who
refuses t0 take a BAC test is entitled to a timely postsuspension hearing
within thirty days 0f seizure 0f his 0r her driver's license.
Matter ochNeely, 119 Idaho at 190. In Driver’s License Suspension ofPlatz, 154 Idaho
960, 303 P.3d 647 (App. 2013), the Court of Appeals recently affirmed that the
procedural due process rights owed in an ALS suspension proceeding, are also owed in a
CDL proceeding:
In Bell, 151 Idaho 659, 262 P.3d 1030, the Idaho Supreme Court held a
driver is entitled t0 procedural due process because an ALS involves state
action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. Bell, 151 Idaho
at 664-65, 262 P.3d at 1035-36 (citing Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112,
97 S.Ct. 1723, 1727, 52 L.Ed.2d 172, 179-80 (1977); State v. Ankney,m
Idaho 1, 3-4, 704 P.2d 333, 335-36 (1985); In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937,
945, 155 P.3d 1176, 1184 (Ct.App.2006)). We conclude that the same
rights attach relative t0 a CDL proceeding.
Driver's License Suspension ofPlatz, 154 Idaho at 960, 303 P.3d 647 (App. 2013).
In the present case, Mr. Edwards’ interest in his commercial driver's license is
very substantial. Mr. Edwards” commercial driving privileges stand t0 be suspended for
life should the Department’s wrongful license disqualification be upheld. Clearly, for the
reasons outlined above, the erroneous deprivation 0f Mr. Edwards' commercial driving
privileges, upon which Mr. Edwards relies 0n for his livelihood in the trucking industry,
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prejudices a very substantial right. 
IV. 
MR. EDWARDS IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES. 
I.A.R. 40 addresses an award of costs under appropriate circumstances. It states in 
pertinent part: 
(a) Costs to Prevailing Party. With the exception of post-
conviction appeals and appeals from proceedings involving the 
termination of parental rights or an adoption, costs shall be allowed 
as a matter of course to the prevailing party unless otherwise 
provided by law or order of the Court.  
 
I.C. § 12-117 delineates those circumstances in which attorney’s fees shall be 
awarded. It states: 
12-117 ATTORNEY’S FEES, WITNESS FEES AND 
ESPENSES AWARDED IN CERTAIN INSTANCES. (1) Unless 
otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as 
adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a 
person, the state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing 
the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing 
party reasonable attorney’s fees witness fees and other reasonable 
expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. 
 
I.A.R. 41 discusses some of the particulars involved in requesting an award of 
attorney fees on appeal, thus solidifying the conclusion that an award of attorney fees on 
appeal may be appropriate and available in certain instances. 
In the instant case, costs should awarded to Mr. Edwards should the Court 
determine he is the prevailing party. Additionally, Mr. Edwards should be awarded his 
attorney’s fees, assuming he is the prevailing party, as the Department acted without a 




      For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Edwards respectfully requests that the decision of 
the Hearing Examiner be overturned and Mr. Edwards’ lifetime commercial driver’s 
license disqualification be vacated, and he be awarded his reasonable costs and attorney’s 
fees. 
DATED this 2nd day of April, 2019. 
 
                                                                      /s/ R.D. Watson_________ 
                                                                      R.D. Watson 
                                                                      Attorney for Bruce A. Edwards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
